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rate uncertainty. The firm is export-flexible in that it makes its export deci-
sion after observing the realized spot exchange rate. However, export-flexibility
is limited by certain minimum sales requirements due to long-term consider-
ations. This creates a piecewise linear exchange rate exposure. If the firm is
allowed to use customized derivatives contracts, its optimal hedge position can
be replicated by selling currency forward contracts and call options. If the firm
is restricted to use forward contracts as the sole hedging instrument, optimal
output is unambiguously smaller. Introducing currency call options thus stim-
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I. Introduction
Exchange rate risk management has become increasingly important as more and
more firms of all sizes and of all industries source and sell abroad. In face of the
continuing incidence of exchange rate fluctuations, international firms need to devote
themselves to devising various risk management strategies so as to cope with their
exchange rate risk exposure. On the one hand, they can adopt an operational hedge
by following flexible sales or input/output policies in response to volatile exchange
rates. On the other hand, they can opt for a financial hedge by trading various types
of currency derivatives. The interaction between operational hedging and financial
hedging is crucial to the understanding of the behavior of international firms under
exchange rate uncertainty.
The extant literature on the competitive exporting firm under exchange rate
uncertainty typically assumes that the firm is risk averse and makes its production,
export, and hedging decisions simultaneously (see, e.g., Benninga, Eldor, and Zilcha,
1985, Broll and Zilcha, 1992, Adam-Mu¨ller, 1997, and Wong, 2003a). Two notable
results emanate. First, the “separation theorem” states that the firm’s optimal
production decision depends neither on its risk attitude nor on the incidence of
the underlying exchange rate uncertainty when there is a currency forward market.
Second, the “full-hedging theorem” states that the firm should completely eliminate
its exchange rate risk exposure by adopting a full hedge if the currency forward
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market is unbiased. A corollary of this theorem is that other hedging instruments
such as currency options appear to be redundant (see, e.g., Battermann, Braulke,
Broll, and Schimmelpfennig, 2000).
To depart from the extant literature by incorporating operational hedging, we
follow Ware and Winter (1988) (see also Sercu, 1992, Broll and Wahl, 1997, and
Wong, 2001) to model export flexibility.1 Specifically, we consider a competitive
exporting firm which makes its export decision (i.e., sales allocation between the
domestic market and a foreign market) only after it has observed the realized spot
exchange rate.2 The export flexibility enjoyed by the firm is, however, deemed to be
restricted in that the firm has to maintain certain minimum levels of domestic sales
and exports. The idea is that firms typically have explicit or implicit obligations to
remain present in a market even under (temporarily) unfavorable conditions. These
obligations may either be due to already signed contracts with existing customers, or
be simply due to the necessity to maintain a minimum level of activity in a market
so as to remain visible to future customers.3 This minimum level of activity is the
result of a longer-term consideration in which market exit and entry costs determine
whether a firm is currently in the market with at least the minimum level of activity,
or whether the firm is not in the market at all. Instead of attempting to analyze
these longer-term market entry and exit decisions of the exporting firm, we take
the minimum levels of domestic sales and exports as given and proceed from there.4
This restriction on the firm’s export flexibility is exactly the point where our model
differs from those of Broll and Wahl (1997) and Wong (2001).
Given the restricted export flexibility, the firm’s optimal sales allocation rule is
state contingent: It exports more than the minimum level to the foreign market when
the realized spot exchange rate is sufficiently favorable such that the foreign price
(measured in units of the domestic currency) exceeds the domestic price; otherwise,
it maintains the minimum level of exports and sells the rest in the domestic market.
This operational hedge through the ex post sales allocation rule transforms the ex
1Eldor and Zilcha (1987) and Wong (2003b) model export flexibility in a similar fashion for the
globally competitive but domestically monopolistic exporting firm.
2Ben-Zvi and Helpman (1992) argue that international transactions are better described by such
a sequence of moves.
3Bagwell and Staiger (1989) and Bagwell (1991) show that export subsidies facilitate the entry
of high-quality firms under asymmetric information. Shy (2000) goes one step further and argues
that the decision to export is chosen to signal product quality, despite the fact that exporting is
dominated by non-exporting under symmetric information.
4Franke (1991) and Sercu and Vanhulle (1992) focus on the effect of exchange rate uncertainty
on exit and entry decisions of exporting firms, but their models do not analyze financial hedging.
However, their analyses can be interpreted as capturing a firm’s long-term decisions on market
presence in the foreign market whereas this paper focuses on a shorter horizon where these decisions
are taken as given.
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ante uncertainty to feature a call option-like pattern such that the firm’s exchange
rate exposure is piecewise linear.
To examine how the restricted export-flexible firm’s production decision is af-
fected by the availability of hedging opportunities, we consider two different scenar-
ios. First, we allow the firm to avail itself of customized derivatives contracts so as
to achieve the first-best risk-sharing outcome. We show in this first-best hedging
environment that the firm optimally tailors its customized derivatives contract in a
way that its hedged domestic currency profits are stabilized at the expected level.
We further show that such a hedge position can be replicated by using plain vanilla
derivatives, namely currency forward contracts and currency call options with a sin-
gle strike price, which is set equal to the ratio of the domestic price to the foreign
price.
Since currency options may not exist in countries where derivative markets are
just starting to develop, it is of interest to study the second-best environment wherein
the firm is restricted to use currency forward contracts as the sole hedging instru-
ment.5 Currency forward contracts, because of their simple linear specification, are
by and large readily available. We show in this second-best environment that the
firm’s optimal output is unambiguously below the first-best level. In other words,
introducing currency options so as to complete the incomplete hedging environment
enhances the firm’s incentives to produce. There is thus an output enhancement
effect of currency options in the context of export flexibility.
In an extension, we generalize the firm’s exchange rate exposure from the piece-
wise linear shape as dictated by the optimal response to restricted export flexibility.
In its generalized form, the firm’s exchange rate exposure may have any shape. We
discuss a number of factors driving the shape of the firm’s exposure and show that
the existence of a complete market is sufficient to derive the separation property for
a firm whose exchange rate exposure is state dependent.
Our paper is not the first to analyze the joint use of currency forward contracts
and currency options. Lapan, Moschini and Hanson (1991) and Frechette (2001)
consider the case of a producer facing price risk and basis risk; Moschini and Lapan
(1995) incorporate production risk as an additional source of risk. Chang and Wong
(2003) analyze the joint use of options and forward contracts in a cross hedging
problem whereas Wong (2003a) focuses on a problem under joint price and quantity
risk. Breuer and Gu¨rtler (2001) as well as Lien andWong (2004) consider the optimal
5See Lien and Tse (2002) for a recent overview of the use of futures contracts for hedging
purposes.
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currency hedge of international bidders. All these models have at least two different
sources of risk. The present paper shows that the joint use of forward contracts and
options can be rationalized even if there is only one single source of risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II delineates a variant
model of the competitive exporting firm under exchange rate uncertainty wherein
the firm possesses restricted export flexibility. Section III characterizes the firm’s
optimal production and hedging decisions when complete hedging with customized
derivatives contracts is accessible to the firm. Section IV examines the firm’s opti-
mal production and hedging decisions when currency forward contracts are the sole
hedging instrument. Section V briefly addresses the firm’s optimal decisions under a
generalized type of exchange rate exposure. The final section concludes. All proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
II. The model
Consider a one-period, two-date (0 and 1) model of the competitive exporting
firm under exchange rate uncertainty.6 The firm sells its single output in both the
domestic country and a foreign country. Let Pd be the per-unit selling price in the
domestic market, where Pd is denominated in the domestic currency. Likewise, let
Pf be the per-unit selling price in the foreign market net of per-unit transaction
costs of exporting, where Pf is denominated in the foreign currency. These two
per-unit selling prices, Pd and Pf , are fixed and known to the firm ex ante. Due
to the segmentation of the domestic and foreign markets, arbitrage transactions are
either impossible or unprofitable, thereby rendering the violation of the law of one
price.7
At date 0, the firm has to commit to an output level, Q, according to a cost func-
tion, C(Q), compounded to date 1, where C(0) ≥ 0, C ′(Q) > 0, and C ′′(Q) > 0. The
then prevailing spot exchange rate at date 1, S˜, expressed in units of the domestic
currency per unit of the foreign currency, is a non-negative random variable.8 Let
G(S) be the firm’s subjective cumulative distribution function of S˜, over support
[S, S], where 0 ≤ S < Pd/Pf < S ≤ ∞.
The firm possesses export flexibility in that it makes its export decision after the
exchange rate uncertainty is resolved. That is, the firm’s sales allocation between
6See Broll and Eckwert (2000) for a related multiperiod model.
7The assumption of imperfect arbitrage among national markets is supported by a number of
empirical studies of the law of one price such as Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001) and Parsley and
Wei (1996).
8Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
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the domestic and foreign markets is made contingent on the realized date 1 spot
exchange rate S. The export flexibility enjoyed by the firm is, however, deemed
to be restricted. Due to various explicit and implicit obligations, the firm has to
maintain certain minimum levels of domestic sales and exports. These quantities are
exogenously given and are denoted by Qd for the domestic market and by Qf for the
foreign market.9 The firm as such is flexible in allocating its sales only with respect
to the amount of output exceeding the sum of these minimum levels of domestic sales
and exports. In other words, the export flexibility prevails only for Q−Qd−Qf > 0.
The firm’s optimal sales allocation rule under the restricted export flexibility is
as follows. If SPf ≥ Pd, the firm sells the minimum amount, Qd, in the domestic
market and exports the rest, Q−Qd, to the foreign country. On the other hand, if
SPf < Pd, the firm exports the minimum amount, Qf , to the foreign country and
sells the rest, Q−Qf , in the domestic market. Thus, the firm’s date 1 sales revenue
denominated in the domestic currency is given by
R(S,Q) =

SPfQf + Pd(Q−Qf ) if SPf < Pd,
SPf (Q−Qd) + PdQd if SPf ≥ Pd,
(1)
which can be compactly written as
R(S˜, Q) = S˜PfQf + Pd(Q−Qf ) + Pf max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)(Q−Qd −Qf ). (2)
Inspection of equation (2) reveals that the restricted flexibility in making the export
decision after observing the realized date 1 spot exchange rate, S, bestows a valuable
real (call) option on the firm. This real option is exercised whenever S is sufficiently
high, i.e., S ∈ (Pd/Pf , S].
To examine the impact of complete and incomplete hedging on the firm’s produc-
tion decision, we consider two scenarios. In the next section, we allow the firm to use
customized derivatives contracts to hedge against its exchange rate risk exposure.
The payoff of a customized derivatives contract, net of its price compounded to date
1, is delineated by a function, Φ(S), whose functional form is to be chosen by the
firm at date 0. The firm’s date 1 profits denominated in the domestic currency are
given by
Π˜ = R(S˜, Q)− C(Q) + Φ(S˜), (3)
where R(S˜, Q) is defined in equation (2). To serve the purposes of examining the
hedging role and output effects of the customized derivative contract, it suffices to
9For simplicity, it is assumed that those realizations of S˜ where the firm will optimally exit either
the domestic or the foreign market because of long-term considerations are not contained in the
support of S˜. Without this assumption, it might be possible that the firm exits either market just
in the period under consideration.
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restrict our attention to the case where the derivative contract is fairly priced. That
is, the functional form of Φ(S) is constrained by E[Φ(S˜)] = 0, where E(·) is the
expectation operator with respect to G(S).10
In Section IV, we restrict the firm to use currency forward contracts as the sole
hedging instrument. Each of these contracts calls for delivery of F units of the
domestic currency per unit of the foreign currency. Thus, in the second-best (vis-a`-
vis the first-best) hedging environment, Φ(S) ≡ (F − S)H, where H is the number
of the currency forward contracts sold (purchased if negative) by the firm at date 0.
Since E[Φ(S˜)] = 0, we have F = E(S˜).
The firm possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, U(Π), defined
over its date 1 domestic currency profit, Π, with U ′(Π) > 0 and U ′′(Π) < 0, in-
dicating the presence of risk aversion.11 Hence, our model directly relates firms
with badly diversified owners managing their firm. In addition, it might also apply
to firms with well-diversified owners for the following reasons: Stulz (1984) argues
that the risk aversion of managers can cause firms to behave in a risk averse man-
ner because this might make managers better off without creating addition costs to
shareholders. According to DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), hedging might also serve as
a means for managers to alter their perception on the labor market. As pointed out
by Smith and Stulz (1985), the convexity of corporate tax schemes may also serve
as a rationale for a concave objective function at firm level.12 A concave objective
function also applies if a market-value maximizing firm faces convex cost of financial
distress.13
Anticipating its optimal contingent export decision, the firm chooses its output
level, Q, and the functional form of its exotic derivative contract, Φ(S), at date 0 so
10Our intention here is not to impose an ad hoc pricing theory on derivatives but to focus on the
hedging role and output effects of the customized derivative contract. Thus, G(S) is not the pricing
kernel of the standard option pricing theory.
Relaxing the assumption of fairly priced securities implies the existence of a risk premium. It is
well-known from Arrow (1965. p. 39) that any risk averse decision maker will speculate on a risk
premium. See also Gollier (2001, Ch. 4). Hence, the firm will optimally enter into speculative
derivatives positions on top of the hedging positions addressed in Propositions 1 to 3 below. Fur-
thermore, these positions will generally be dependent. Should the firm face a situation with more
than one separately tradable derivatives contract at least one of which exhibits a risk premium, the
firm’s problem resembles a portfolio problem that would have to be solved simultaneously with the
production, export and hedging problem. See Lapan, Moschini and Hanson (1991). Since this paper
focuses on the use of derivatives contracts for hedging purposes, the optimal derivatives positions
resulting from both hedging and speculative motives are not analyzed.
11Futures hedging under more general preferences which include loss aversion and disappointment
aversion is analyzed by Lien (2001a, b) and Lien and Wang (2002).
12However, this argument is not supported by the evidence found by Graham and Rogers (2002).
See also Graham and Smith (1999). Eldor and Zilcha (2002) analyze the interaction between optimal
export production and futures hedging, given a convex tax scheme.
13See Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993). Empirical evidence for firms hedging in order to reduce
expected costs of financial distress is provided by Graham and Rogers (2002).
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as to maximize the expected utility of its date 1 domestic currency profit:
max
Q,Φ(S)
E[U(Π˜)] s.t. E[Φ(S˜)] = 0, (4)
where Π˜ is defined in equation (3).
III. Complete hedging with customized derivatives contracts
The first-order conditions for program (4) are given by14
E{U ′[Π∗(S˜)][Pd + Pf max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)− C ′(Q∗)]} = 0, (5)
U ′[Π∗(S)]− λ∗ = 0 ∀S ∈ [S, S], (6)
where Π∗(S) = R(S,Q∗) − C(Q∗) + Φ∗(S), λ is the Lagrange multiplier, and an
asterisk (∗) indicates an optimal level. The second-order conditions for the unique
maximum, Q∗ and Φ∗(S), are satisfied given risk aversion and the strict convexity
of C(Q).
Proposition 1. If the restricted export-flexible firm is allowed to use customized
derivatives contracts for hedging purposes, the firm’s optimal output, Q∗, solves
C ′(Q∗) = Pd + Pf E[max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)], (7)
and its optimal hedge position, Φ∗(S), satisfies that
Φ∗(S) = [E(S˜)− S]PfQf
+Pf{E[max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)]−max(S − Pd/Pf , 0)]}(Q∗ −Qd −Qf ).
(8)
The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. The availability of customized deriva-
tives contracts offers actuarially fair “insurance” to the firm in the sense that trading
these contracts does not affect the expected value of of its domestic currency profits.
However, reducing the variability of these profits increases expected utility. There-
fore, the firm tailors its hedge position, Φ(S), in a way that its date 1 domestic
currency profits, R(S,Q)−C(Q) + Φ(S), are stabilized at the expected level for all
S ∈ [S, S]. The optimal output, Q∗, is then chosen to maximize E[R(S˜, Q)]−C(Q),
thereby yielding equation (7). This equation also indicates that the existence of cus-
tomized derivatives contracts allowing for the complete elimination of exchange rate
risk is sufficient to derive the separation theorem for the restricted export-flexible
14We implicitly assume that the firm possesses some degree of export flexibility at the optimum,
i.e., Q∗ > Qd + Qf . This avoids the lengthy discussion of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and corner
solutions, which is not the focus of this paper.
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firm since optimal output neither depends on the degree of risk aversion nor on
the incidence of the exchange rate risk. It is important to notice that this separa-
tion result holds independently of whether the customized derivatives contracts are
perceived as fairly priced or not.15
Proposition 2. The restricted export-flexible firm’s optimal customized derivatives
position, Φ∗(S), can be replicated by selling PfQf currency forward contracts and
writing Pf (Q∗ − Qd − Qf ) currency call options with the strike price set equal to
Pd/Pf .
Proposition 2 describes how we can replicate the optimal customized derivatives
contract characterized in equation (8) by trading forward contracts and plain vanilla
call options.16 Specifically, the short position of PfQf currency forward contracts
is aimed at the exchange rate risk exposure associated with the minimum level of
exports, Qf . The option position of writing Pf (Q∗ − Qd − Qf ) currency call op-
tions with the strike price Pd/Pf , on the other hand, is used to hedge against the
conditional exchange rate risk exposure created by the restricted export flexibility:
The existence of additional foreign currency revenue of Pf (Q∗ −Qd −Qf ) is condi-
tional on the date 1 spot exchange rate exceeding Pd/Pf . For all S < Pd/Pf , the
call options are not exercised and the forward position provides a full hedge for the
foreign currency revenue of PfQf . For all S ≥ Pd/Pf , the call options are exercised
and the combined forward and call option position offers a full hedge for the foreign
currency revenue of Pf (Q∗ − Qd). The firm’s date 1 domestic currency profits as
such becomes invariant to the exchange rate.
If there is no export flexibility (i.e., Qd = 0 and Qf = Q), it is evident from
equation (2) that the firm’s date 1 domestic currency revenue is linear in S. In this
case, currency forward contracts are the preferred hedging instrument since they are
also linear in S (see Battermann, Braulke, Broll, and Schimmelpfennig, 2000). On
the other hand, if the firm is fully export-flexible (i.e., Qd = Qf = 0), it is evident
from equation (2) that the firm’s date 1 domestic currency revenue is piecewise linear
in S with a zero slope for all S ≤ Pd/Pf . Broll and Wahl (1997) show that writing
currency call options with the strike price at Pd/Pf eliminates all exchange rate risk,
thereby making currency forward contracts redundant.
15A sketch substantiating this statement can be found in the Appendix, below the proof of Propo-
sition 2.
16Sercu (1992) also describes how an export-flexible firm’s profits can be hedged with options.
However, he does not analyze the optimal hedging position since his analysis is based on the
Modigliani-Miller assumptions.
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The restricted export flexibility allows the firm to implicitly hedge against its
exchange rate risk exposure by the ex post sales allocation between the domestic
and foreign markets. Specifically, for all S < Pd/Pf , the firm optimally allocates
less, but still some, output to the foreign market and more output to the domestic
market. This implicit real hedge has two effects on the firm’s unhedged domestic
currency profits at date 1. First, the unhedged profits is less volatile. Second, it
becomes convex in S with strictly positive slope everywhere. The convexity calls
for the use of currency options, similar to the case of a fully export-flexible firm.
Due to the minimum export level, the slope is positive even at low realizations of S˜.
This requires the use of currency forward contracts in addition to currency options,
contrary to the case of a fully export-flexible firm.
Loosely speaking, imposing some export flexibility onto the competitive export-
ing firm results in the optimality of using currency options for hedging purposes.
Alternatively, restricting full export flexibility to some extent offers a hedging role
for currency forward contracts. Hence, the restricted export-flexible firm has three
appealing features: First, it seems to be more realistic than a fully export-flexible or
an entirely export-inflexible firm. Second, it optimally uses a portfolio of currency
forward contracts and currency options for hedging purposes, which is consistent
with the observed risk management behavior (see, e.g., Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston,
1998, and Bodnar and Gebhardt, 1999). Third, it shows how to rationalize the joint
use of forward contracts and options without the need to introduce a second source
of risk into the model.
IV. Incomplete hedging with forward contracts only
In this section, we restrict the firm to use currency forward contracts as the sole
hedging instrument such that Φ(S) ≡ (F − S)H. We are particularly interested
in examining the effects of such an incomplete hedging environment on the firm’s
optimal production decision. But before, we look at the optimal hedging position.
Proposition 3. If the restricted export-flexible firm is allowed to trade currency
forward contracts only, its optimal forward position, H∗∗, satisfies that PfQf <
H∗∗ < Pf (Q∗∗ −Qd).
The intuition underlying Proposition 3 is as follows. Inspection of equation (2)
reveals that the firm’s unhedged domestic currency revenue at date 1 is piecewise
linear and convex in S. For high realizations of S˜ (i.e., S ≥ Pd/Pf ), the optimal sales
allocation rule is to export as much as possible, which generates the foreign currency
9
revenue of Pf (Q−Qd). The firm could completely eliminate this exchange rate risk
exposure by setting H = Pf (Q−Qd). For low realizations of S˜ (i.e., S < Pd/Pf ), the
foreign currency revenue only amounts to PfQf . In this case, complete elimination
of the exchange rate risk calls for setting H = PfQf . It is thus evident that there
is a conflict between hedging against the exchange rate risk for high and for low
realizations of S˜. Proposition 3 states that the firm optimally opts for a compromise
between these two forward positions.
The next result focuses on the impact of incomplete hedging on optimal produc-
tion.
Proposition 4. The restricted export-flexible firm’s output is lower when it is allowed
to trade currency forward contracts as the sole hedging instrument than when it is
also allowed to trade currency call options with the strike price, Pd/Pf . That is,
Q∗∗ < Q∗.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows. Using equation (2), the firm’s
marginal domestic currency revenue at date 1 is given by Pd+Pf max(S˜−Pd/Pf , 0).
If the firm can trade currency call options with the strike price equal to Pd/Pf ,
this uncertain marginal revenue can be stabilized at the expected level. Rewrite
Pd + Pf max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0) = S˜Pf + Pf max(Pd/Pf − S˜, 0). If the firm can only
trade currency forward contracts, the first risk component, S˜Pf , can be completely
eliminated but not the second risk component, Pf max(Pd/Pf − S˜, 0), which is non-
linear. Comparing these two scenarios with the same expected marginal revenue,
Proposition 4 states that the firm, given risk aversion, optimally produces less under
uncertain marginal revenue than under certain marginal revenue. Thus, Proposition
4 is in line with other results showing the output enhancing effect of completing
a previously incomplete market for currency derivatives, see Benninga, Eldor and
Zilcha (1985) and Broll, Wahl and Zilcha (1995).
V. An extension: State-dependent exposure
As equation (2) shows, the firm’s revenues in domestic currency and, hence,
its exchange rate exposure is piecewise linear in the exchange rate due to restricted
export flexibility. Proposition 2 shows that this exposure can be perfectly hedged by
a portfolio of currency forward contracts and currency options that exactly matches
the shape of the firm’s exposure. Proposition 1 indicates that the availability of
a perfect hedge leads to the separation theorem, determining the firm’s optimal
output. If these currency derivatives contracts are fairly priced, risk aversion ensures
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that a perfect hedge is also optimal as shown in Proposition 1. The purpose of this
section is to briefly analyze the firm’s optimal decisions under a more general type
of exchange rate exposure and to discuss why such types of exposure may arise.
The motivation for the piecewise linear exposure was based on the firm’s long-
term optimization dictating at least a minimum level of activity in both the domestic
as well as the foreign market. In a more general setting, the firm’s export strategy
will result from the strategic interaction with its current and potential competitors.
The shape of the firm’s exchange rate exposure depends on the structure of the
entire industry such that a large variety of exposures may arise.
As an example, consider a scenario where number of export-flexible firms from
the same country compete in an imperfect product market in another country. Un-
less the firms are identical, the critical exchange rate at which a particular firm starts
exporting will be different across firms. In addition, the foreign sales price is likely
to reflect the degree of competition and will, hence, be dependent on the exchange
rate as well. This should lead to a more complex shape of the firm’s exposure. One
possibility is an exposure where there is a “kink” at each critical exchange rate,
defined by either the firm or one of its competitors entering the foreign market, such
that the exposure is piecewise linear with many different slopes. Intra-industry trade
from the foreign country to the domestic market further complicates the strategic
interaction and, thereby, is most likely to have an impact of the firm’s exchange rate
exposure as well. In sum, each industry equilibrium will dictate an optimal export
strategy for the firm that, in turn, will give rise to a particular shape of the firm’s
exchange rate exposure.
Rather than motivating a particular shape of the firm’s exposure, the remainder
of this section focuses on a generalization from the piecewise linear shape of the
exposure to an exposure that is entirely state-dependent, i.e. that can basically have
any shape. Consider a finite and discrete state space where Si is the realization of
the exchange rate S˜ in state i with i, j = 1, ... I. The market is complete if there
are state contingent claims for all states i. If ei(S˜) denotes the payoff of a state
contingent claim for state i, then ei(Sj) = 1 if i = j and ei(Sj) = 0 otherwise. fi is
the exogenously given price of a claim relating to state i, compounded to date 1. Let
Rˆ(Q, S˜) denote the firm’s state-dependent revenues, denominated in the domestic
currency. Rˆ(Q, S˜) captures the firm’s exposure to the uncertain exchange rate S˜. It
is important to notice that no further assumptions on the shape of Rˆ(Q, S˜) have to
be imposed.17 Hence, Rˆ(Q, S˜) is capable of representing state dependent exchange
17The revenue function R(Q, S˜) as derived in Section II is piecewise linear in S.
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rate exposure.
Furthermore, let φi denote the number of state contingent claims on state i that
the firm purchases, φi > 0, or sells, φi < 0. Then, the firm’s profits are given by
Πˆ(S˜) = Rˆ(Q, S˜)−C(Q)+∑Ii=1 φi(ei(S˜)−fi). The firm’s problem is to maximize its
expected utility by optimally choosing its output and its portfolio of I different state
contingent claims φi. The following result shows that the existence of a complete and
competitive market for state contingent claims is sufficient to derive the separation
theorem if the firm’s hedging activities do not affect its competitors’ activities.18
Proposition 5. If there is a complete and competitive market for state contingent
claims and if the revenue function Rˆ(Q, S˜) captures the firm’s exchange rate expo-
sure, then the firm’s optimal output, Q∗, is determined by
C ′(Q∗) =
I∑
i=1
fi
∂Rˆ(Q∗, Si)
∂Q
. (9)
The firm’s optimal output equates marginal cost and the sum of all state-
dependent marginal revenues, weighted with the price of the respective state-con-
tingent claim. Neither the degree of risk aversion nor the incidence of the exchange
rate risk affect the firm’s optimal output. Proposition 5 shows that the existence
of a complete market is sufficient to derive the separation theorem for an arbitrary
dependence of the firm’s revenue on the exchange rate. Like Proposition 1, it pro-
vides an example of the result that the existence of a set of hedging instruments that
exactly matches the firm’s exposure is sufficient for the separation theorem to hold.
For the piecewise linear exposure outlined in Section II, currency forward contracts
and call options with a particular strike price are sufficient as Propositions 1 and 2
show. For the arbitrary shape of the firm’s exposure as given by Rˆ(Q, S˜), a complete
market for state contingent claims on S˜ is sufficient for the separation theorem.
Proposition 5 does not require the state contingent claims to be fairly priced.
However, if they are, the risk averse firm will eliminate exchange rate risk from
its profits completely by choosing a full hedge. To see why, notice that the first-
order conditions for φ∗i reduce to −Cov(ei(S˜), U ′(Πˆ∗(S˜))) since fi = E{ei(S˜)} where
Cov(·, ·) denotes the covariance operator with respect to G(S). In order for these
conditions to hold for all I state contingent claims, Πˆ∗ must be independent of S˜ in
order to ensure that U ′(Πˆ∗(S˜)) is a constant. This requires full hedging.
18So far, only very few attempts have been made to capture the effect of corporate hedging on
product market equilibria in a rigorous model. See Adam, Dasgupta and Titman (2005) and Mello
and Ruckes (2005).
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VI. Conclusions
Exchange rate risk management and its interaction with real operations play a
significant role for an international firm’s success. This paper has examined the
optimal production and hedging decisions of the risk averse competitive exporting
firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm possesses export flexibility in that it
makes its export decision after the resolution of the exchange rate uncertainty. The
export flexibility enjoyed by the firm is, however, limited by certain minimum sales
requirements due to long-term considerations. As such, the firm’s sales allocation
between the domestic market and a foreign market is made state contingent on the
realized spot exchange rate. The firm exports more than the minimum level to the
foreign market when the realized spot exchange rate is sufficiently favorable; other-
wise, it maintains the minimum level of exports and sells the rest in the domestic
market. This operational hedge through the ex post sales allocation rule results in a
call option-like feature in the ex ante uncertainty and, hence, in a piecewise lineare
exchange rate exposure.
We have considered two different hedging environments. In the first-best envi-
ronment, the firm is allowed to avail itself of customized derivatives contracts for
hedging purposes. We have shown that the firm optimally tailors its customized
derivatives contract so as to stabilize its domestic currency profits at the expected
level. Furthermore, we have shown that such a customized hedge position can be
replicated by trading plain vanilla derivatives of currency forward contracts and cur-
rency call options with a single strike price, which is set equal to the ratio of the
domestic price to the foreign price. In the second-best environment wherein the firm
is restricted to use currency forward contracts as the sole hedging instrument, we
have shown that the firm’s optimal output is unambiguously below the first-best
level. In other words, introducing currency options so as to complete the incomplete
hedging environment enhances the firm’s incentives to produce. Thus, we have es-
tablished the output enhancement effect of currency options in the context of export
flexibility.
In an extension, we have discussed why the firm’s exchange rate exposure might
have a shape other than the piecewise linear. The exporting firm’s interaction with
its competitors plays a particularly important role here. We have shown that a
complete market for state contingent claims on the exchange rate is sufficient to
preserve the separation property for an arbitrary shape of the firm’s exposure. If
these claims are fairly priced, the firm will fully hedge.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
It is evident from equation (6) that Π∗(S) = U ′−1(λ∗) for all S ∈ [S, S].
Since U
′−1(λ∗) is a positive constant, Π∗(S) must be independent of S, requiring
∂R(S,Q∗)/∂S = −∂Φ∗(S)/∂S for all S ∈ [S, S]. Combining this with E[Φ∗(S˜)] = 0
directly leads to equation (8). Substituting equation (8) into equation (5) yields
equation (7) since U ′[Π∗(S˜)] is a constant. 2
Proof of Proposition 2
This proposition follows immediately from equation (8). 2
Armed with Proposition 2, it is straightforward to show that the (customized)
derivatives contracts do not have to be perceived as fairly priced in order to derive
the separation theorem. In fact, the existence of call options with strike price Pd/Pf
alone implies the separation result. Let X denote the number of call options written
with strike price Pd/Pf and call option premium P . Then, the firm’s profits are given
by Π˜ = R(S˜, Q)− C(Q) + (F − S˜)H +X(P −max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)). The first-order
condition forX∗ is equivalent to PE{U ′[Π∗(S˜)]} = E{U ′[Π∗(S˜)]max(S˜−Pd/Pf , 0)]}.
Substituting this relation into (5) directly leads to the separation result, C ′(Q∗) =
Pd + PfP , without imposing any additional assumptions on the forward rate F or
the call option premium P . If the call option is perceived as fairly priced such that
P = E[max(S˜ − Pd/Pf )], (7) follows directly.
Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting Φ(S) ≡ (F−S)H into program (4), where F = E(S˜), the first-order
conditions become
E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)][Pd + Pf max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)− C ′(Q∗∗)]} = 0, (10)
E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)](F − S˜)} = 0, (11)
where Π∗∗(S) = R(S,Q∗∗)−C(Q∗∗)+(F−S)H∗∗ and a double asterisk (∗∗) indicates
an optimal level. The second-order conditions for the unique maximum, Q∗∗ and
H∗∗, are satisfied given the strict concavity of U(Π) and the strict convexity of C(Q).
Using the covariance operator, Cov(·, ·), with respect to G(S), equation (11) can be
equivalently stated as
Cov{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)], S˜} = 0, (12)
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since F = E(S˜). Partially differentiating U ′[Π∗∗(S)] with respect to S yields
∂
∂S
U ′[Π∗∗(S)] = U ′′[Π∗∗(S)]
×
[
PfQf −H∗∗ + Pf (Q∗∗ −Qd −Qf ) ∂
∂S
max(S − Pd/Pf , 0)
]
.
(13)
Notice that ∂max(S − Pd/Pf , 0)/∂S ≥ 0. If H∗∗ ≤ PfQf , equation (13) and
U ′′(Π) < 0 imply that U ′[Π∗∗(S)] is decreasing in S everywhere; if H∗∗ ≥ Pf (Q∗∗ −
Qd), then U ′[Π∗∗(S)] increases in S everywhere. Hence, Cov{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)], S˜} is neg-
ative or positive, respectively. In either case, it contradicts equation (12). Thus, for
equation (12) to hold, we must have PfQf < H∗∗ < Pf (Q∗∗ −Qd). 2
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of Proposition 4 uses a lemma that is stated and proven first.
Lemma. There exist two distinct points, S1 ∈ (S, Pd/Pf ) and S2 ∈ (Pd/Pf , S), such
that U ′[Π∗∗(S)] ≥ E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]} for all S ∈ [S1, S2] and U ′[Π∗∗(S)] < E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]}
for all S ∈ [S, S1)
⋃
(S2, S], where the equality holds only at S = S1 and S = S2.
Proof of the lemma. Using equation (13) and the fact that PfQf < H∗∗ < Pf (Q∗∗−
Qd), we know that U ′[Π∗∗(S)] is strictly increasing for all S ∈ [S, Pd/Pf ) and strictly
decreasing for all S ∈ (Pd/Pf , S]. In other words, U ′[Π∗∗(S)] is hump-shaped and
attains a unique maximum at S = Pd/Pf . Since E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]} is the expected value
of U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)], there must exist at least one and at most two distinct points in (S, S)
at which U ′[Π∗∗(S)] = E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]}.
Suppose first that U ′[Π∗∗(S)] ≥ E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]}. Then, there must exist a unique
point, Sˆ ∈ (Pd/Pf , S), such that U ′[Π∗∗(S)] > E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]} for all S ∈ (S, Sˆ) and
U ′[Π∗∗(S)] < E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]} for all S ∈ (Sˆ, S]. Thus, we have∫ S
S
{
U ′[Π∗∗(S)]− E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]}
}
(S − Sˆ) dG(S) < 0. (14)
However, the left-hand side of inequality (14) equals Cov{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)], S˜}. Thus,
inequality (14) contradicts the first-order condition for H∗∗ in equation (12).
Now suppose that U ′[Π∗∗(S)] ≥ E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]}. Then, there must exist a unique
point, Sˇ ∈ (S, Pd/Pf ), such that U ′[Π∗(S)] < E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]} for all S ∈ [S, Sˇ) and
U ′[Π∗∗(S)] > E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]} for all S ∈ (Sˇ, S). Thus, we have∫ S
S
{
U ′[Π∗∗(S)]− E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]}
}
(S − Sˇ) dG(S) > 0. (15)
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Inequality (15) is contradictory to equation (12). Both U ′[Π∗∗(S)] and U ′[Π∗∗(S)]
are thus strictly less than E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]}. In other words, the statement in the
lemma must be true. 2
Proof of Proposition 4. Using the covariance operator, we can write equation (10)
as
C ′(Q∗∗) = Pd + PfE[max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)]
+Pf
Cov{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)],max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)}
E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]} .
(16)
Since E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]} > 0, if Cov{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)],max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)} < (>) 0, the
strict convexity of C(Q) and equations (7) and (16) imply that Q∗∗ < (>) Q∗.
Let A = E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]|S˜ < Pd/Pf} and B = E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]|S˜ > Pd/Pf}, where
E(·|·) is the conditional expectation operator with respect to G(S). There are two
mutually exclusive cases: (i) A > B and (ii) A ≤ B. Given the strict convex-
ity of C(Q), it follows from equations (5) and (10) that we have to show that
Cov{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)],max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)} < 0 in both cases.
Consider case (i) first. We write Cov{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)],max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)} as
∫ S
Pd/Pf
{
U ′[Π∗∗(S)]− E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]}
}
(S − S2) dG(S)
+
∫ S
Pd/Pf
{
U ′[Π∗∗(S)]− E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]}
}
(S2 − Pd/Pf ) dG(S).
It follows from the lemma that the first term of the above expression is negative.
The second term of the above expression can be written as
(B −A)(S2 − Pd/Pf )G(Pd/Pf )[1−G(Pd/Pf )].
Since S2 > Pd/Pf and 0 < G(Pd/Pf ) < 1, this term is also negative by the supposi-
tion. Hence, we have Cov{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)],max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)} < 0 in case (i).
Now, consider case (ii). Since S˜ − Pd/Pf = max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)−max(Pd/Pf −
S˜, 0), equation (12) implies Cov{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)],max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)} is equal to
Cov{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)],max(Pd/Pf − S˜, 0)}, which can be written as
∫ Pd/Pf
S
{
U ′[Π∗∗(S)]− E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]}
}
(S1 − S) dG(S)
+
∫ Pd/Pf
S
{
U ′[Π∗∗(S)]− E{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)]}
}
(Pd/Pf − S1) dG(S).
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It follows from the lemma that the first term of the above expression is negative.
The second term of the above expression can be written as
(A−B)(Pd/Pf − S1)G(Pd/Pf )[1−G(Pd/Pf )].
Since S1 < Pd/Pf and 0 < G(Pd/Pf ) < 1, this term is non-positive by the
supposition. Hence, we have Cov{U ′[Π∗∗(S˜)],max(S˜ − Pd/Pf , 0)} < 0 in case (ii).
2
Proof of Proposition 5
The first-order conditions for the optimal output and the set of optimal positions
in state contingent claims are given by
E{U ′[Πˆ∗(S˜)][∂Rˆ(Q∗, S˜)/∂Q− C ′(Q∗)]} = 0, (17)
E{U ′[Πˆ∗(S˜)][ei(S˜)− fi]} = 0 ∀ i. (18)
An asterisk (∗) again denotes an optimal level. Let prob(Si) denote the probability
of state i and rewrite condition (17) as
C ′(Q∗)E{U ′[Πˆ∗(S˜)]} = E{U ′[Πˆ∗(S˜)]∂Rˆ(Q∗, S˜)/∂Q}
=
I∑
i=1
prob(Si)U ′(Πˆ∗(Si))
∂Rˆ(Q∗, Si)
∂Q
.
(19)
Using the properties of ei(S˜), the conditions in (18) can be expressed as
fiE{U ′[Πˆ∗(S˜)]} = U ′[Πˆ∗(Si)]prob(Si) ∀ i. (20)
Substituting the I conditions from (20) into (19) and dividing by E{U ′[Πˆ∗(S˜)]}
results in (9). 2
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